first insights into the current situation in the Caribbean, where a pilot project to monitor 23 antimicrobial resistance through phenotypic resistance measurements combined with whole-24 genome sequencing was set up in collaboration with the Caribbean Public Health Agency 25 (CARPHA). Our first study focused on Klebsiella pneumoniae, a highly relevant organism 26 amongst the Gram-negative opportunistic pathogens world-wide today causing hospital, as 27 well as community-acquired, infections. Our results show that not only carbapenem 28 resistance, but also hypervirulent strains, are circulating in patients in the Caribbean. Our 29 current data does not allow us to infer their prevalence in the population. We argue for the 30 urgent need to further support antimicrobial resistance surveillance and stewardship in this 31 almost uncharted territory, which can make a significant impact on the reduction of 32 antimicrobial usage. 33 34 DATA SUMMARY 35 
36
-Raw sequencing data is deposited at the sequence read archive (SRA), and assemblies are 37 deposited at GenBank, accession numbers for all are given in Dataset S1. 38 -The data of measured resistance phenotypes (Vitek) is also provided in Dataset S1. 39 -The tree file and associated metadata can be investigated and downloaded through the free 40 online platform microreact (https://microreact.org/project/S1-a7KAkV). isolates, information about encoded resistance genes and the phylogeny of the isolates, their 50 distribution in the global K. pneumoniae population, and their resistance phenotype data as 51 determined by the VITEK 2 compact system. The isolates are recent (2017 through 2018) and 52 represent clinically relevant patient isolates from 15 different sites in 12 Caribbean states. 53
These data will be of interest for researchers working on K. pneumoniae and other 54 opportunistic pathogens as well as those interested in mobile genetic elements carrying 55 antimicrobial resistance cassettes. Our data is the only recent survey of antimicrobial resistant 56 opportunistic pathogens from multiple sites within the Caribbean, and is of high significance 57
The increasing level of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in bacterial pathogens is one of the 66 biggest worldwide threats for public health [1] . The spread is amplified as mobile resistance 67 elements can cross both geographic and species borders, and especially Enterobacteriaceae 68 are prone to disseminating plasmids encoding antimicrobial resistance genes [2] . Monitoring 69 the spread of resistant strains and resistance elements is further complicated as most of these 70 bacteria are opportunistic pathogens which can be carried asymptomatically as part of the 71 human microbiota, and the mobility of people today thus greatly contributes to their world-72 wide spread. The phenomenon has been recognised by the major public health agencies, and 73 several surveillance programs are set in place to assess the prevalence of AMR in bacteria. 74
This facilitates more informed decisions for interventions, guidelines for AMR practice and 75 contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms leading to dissemination of AMR and 76 the emergence of new resistances or high-risk lineages [1] . 77 The isolates were not selected for submission in a formal or structured fashion and 119 submission was dependent on the availability of transport media and staff availability. The 120 isolates were mainly from bloodstream, wounds and urine samples, but also from a wide 121 range of other sources, including cerebrospinal fluid; further details on the specimens as well 122 as all accession numbers and sequencing details are given in Table S1 . Phenotypes and 123 antimicrobial susceptibilities were determined using the VITEK 2 compact system (bioMerieux 124 Inc., 100 Rodolph St., Durham, NC27712, USA) within the microbiology laboratory within 125 CARPHA, Port of Spain, Trinidad. 126 Sequencing and analysis 127 DNA was isolated using the QIAamp® DNA Mini kit following manufacturer's instructions 128 within the CARPHA laboratory, Illumina sequencing libraries with a 450-bp insert size were 129 prepared according to the manufacturer's protocols and sequenced on an Illumina HiSeq2000 130 with paired-end reads with a length of 100bp; accession numbers of all samples are given in 131 table S1. The data was de novo assembled using the pipeline as described in [ 
RESULTS

141
The isolates included in this study were submitted by a total of 15 different hospitals 142 in 12 CMS (Figure 2A although this isolate did not carry a carbapenemase gene. However, one isolate belonging to 182 ST11, was found to carry carbapenemase KPC-1 and the AmpC cephalosporinase DHA-1 183 ( Figure 4) . 184
In addition to the main high-risk clones, with respect to antimicrobial resistances, we 186 also noticed isolates belonging to hypervirulent lineages: an ST23 isolate, two isolates 187 belonging to ST65 (AMR0288 and AMR0296), whilst a second ST86 isolate (AMR0062) seems to miss/have lost the virulence plasmid ( Figure  192   4) . 193
Comparing the number of resistance and virulence determinants shows the typical 194 split distribution with highly virulent and highly resistant strains, but the convergence 195 between virulence and resistance cannot be observed in our limited sampling data, although 196 all ingredients are present in the local gene pool ( Figure 5A ). Whilst the resistant isolates are 197 strongly represented in blood and urine isolates ( Figure 5B ), the origins of highly virulent 198 strains are more diverse and includes sterile sites such as CSF as expected ( Figure 5B This study aimed to establish a genomic surveillance network across the Caribbean. 204
Although this study was prematurely terminated it has provided important data. We show 205 that several high-risk multidrug-resistant bacterial clones are present in clinical samples 206 collected across the Caribbean. For K. pneumoniae these include sequence types ST258, ST11, 207 ST15 and ST405. The diversity of the high-risk clones highlights that the risks from AMR are 208 not limited to or described by the spread of a single high-risk lineage across different states 209 or islands. Neither do we see a single plasmid or genetic island moving between relevant 210 pathogens causing disease, but a large pool of diverse K. pneumoniae lineages and resistance 211 elements distributed across region. 212 213 Given the limitations and the lack of a structured surveillance framework, we cannot 214 conclude whether our data accurately reflects the true prevalence or the full extent of spread 215 of these bacteria across this region. However, even given our limited sampling, there is a 216 significant risk of rapid spread or ongoing, unnoticed epidemics of some of these high-risk 217 clones, the presence and circulation of which will be hidden from view without using highly 218 accurate approaches such as WGS. We thank the CARPHA member states public and hospital laboratories for their participation 245 in this study. We thank the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute Pathogen Informatics team for 246 expert informatics support. 247
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